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Abstract
We consider the common-knowledge paradox raised by Halpern and Moses: com-
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1 Introduction
The notion of common knowledge, where everyone knows, everyone knows that
everyone knows, etc., has proven to be fundamental in various disciplines, in-
cluding Philosophy [Lew69], Artificial Intelligence [MSHI79], Game Theory
[Aum76], Psychology [CM81], and Distributed Systems [HM90]. This key no-
tion was first studied by the philosopher David Lewis [Lew69] in the context
of conventions. Lewis pointed out that in order for something to be a conven-
tion, it must in fact be common knowledge among the members of a group.
(For example, the convention that green means “go” and red means “stop” is
presumably common knowledge among the drivers in our society.)
Common knowledge also arises in discourse understanding [CM81]. Suppose
Ann asks Bob “What did you think of the movie?” referring to a showing
of Monkey Business they have just seen. Not only must Ann and Bob both
know that “the movie” refers to Monkey Business, but Ann must know that
Bob knows (so that she can be sure that Bob will give a reasonable answer
to her question), Bob must know that Ann knows that Bob knows (so that
Bob knows that Ann will respond appropriately to his answer), and so on. In
fact, by a closer analysis of this situation, it can be shown that there must be
common knowledge of what movie is meant in order for Bob to answer the
question appropriately.
Finally, as shown in [HM90], common knowledge also turns out to be a pre-
requisite for agreement and coordinated action. This is precisely what makes
it such a crucial notion in the analysis of interacting groups of agents. On the
other hand, in practical settings common knowledge is impossible to achieve.
This puts us in a somewhat paradoxical situation, in that we claim both that
common knowledge is a prerequisite for agreement and coordinated action and
that it cannot be attained. We discuss two answers to this paradox: (1) mod-
eling the world with a coarser granularity, and (2) relaxing the requirements
for coordination.
2 Two puzzles
We start by discussing two well-known puzzles that involve attaining common
knowledge. The first is the “muddy children” puzzle (which goes back at least
to [GS58], although the version we consider here is taken from [Bar81]).
The story goes as follows: Imagine n children playing together. Some, say k of
them, get mud on their foreheads. Each can see the mud on others but not on
his own forehead. Along comes the father, who says, “At least one of you has
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mud on your forehead,” thus expressing a fact known to each of them before
he spoke (if k > 1). The father then asks the following question, over and
over: “Does any of you know whether you have mud on your own forehead?”
Assuming that all the children are perceptive, intelligent, truthful, and that
they answer simultaneously, what will happen?
There is a straightforward proof by induction that the first k − 1 times he
asks the question, they will all say “No,” but then the kth time the children
with muddy foreheads will all answer “Yes.” Let us denote the fact “at least
one child has a muddy forehead” by p. Notice that if k > 1, i.e., more than
one child has a muddy forehead, then every child can see at least one muddy
forehead, and the children initially all know p. Thus, it would seem that the
father does not provide the children with any new information, and so he
should not need to tell them that p holds when k > 1. But this is false! What
the father provides is common knowledge. If exactly k children have muddy
foreheads, then it is straightforward to see that Ek−1p holds before the father
speaks, but Ekp does not (here Ekϕ means ϕ, if k = 0, and everyone knows
Ek−1ϕ, if k ≥ 1). The father’s statement actually converts the children’s
state of knowledge from Ek−1p to Cp (here Cp means that there is common
knowledge of p). With this extra knowledge, they can deduce whether their
foreheads are muddy.
In the muddy children puzzle, the children do not actually need common
knowledge; Ekp suffices for them to figure out whether they have mud on their
foreheads. On the other hand, the coordinated attack problem introduced by
Gray [Gra78] provides an example where common knowledge is truly neces-
sary. In this problem, two generals, each commanding a division of an army,
want to attack a common enemy. They will win the battle only if they attack
the enemy simultaneously; if only one division attacks, it will be defeated.
Thus, the generals want to coordinate their attack. Unfortunately, the only
way they have of communicating is by means of messengers, who might get
lost or captured by the enemy.
Suppose a messenger sent by General A reaches General B with a message
saying “attack at dawn.” Should General B attack? Although the message
was in fact delivered, General A has no way of knowing that it was delivered.
A must therefore consider it possible that B did not receive the message (in
which case B would definitely not attack). Hence A will not attack given his
current state of knowledge. Knowing this, and not willing to risk attacking
alone, B cannot attack based solely on receiving A’s message. Of course, B
can try to improve matters by sending the messenger back to A with an ac-
knowledgment. Even if the messenger reaches A, similar reasoning shows that
neither A nor B will attack at this point either. In fact, Yemini and Cohen
[YC79] proved, by induction on the number of messages, that no number of
successful deliveries of acknowledgments to acknowledgments can allow the
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generals to attack. Halpern and Moses [HM90] showed the relationship be-
tween coordinated attack and common knowledge, and used this to give a
“knowledge-based” proof of Yemini and Cohen’s result. Specifically, assume
that the generals behave according to some predetermined deterministic pro-
tocol; that is, a general’s actions (what messages he sends and whether he
attacks) are a deterministic function of his history and the time on his clock.
Assume further that in the absence of any successful communication, neither
general will attack. Halpern and Moses then prove the following theorem:
Theorem 1 [HM90] A correct protocol for the coordinated attack problem
must have the property that whenever the generals attack, it is common knowl-
edge that they are attacking.
Halpern and Moses then define the notion of a system where communication
is not guaranteed. Roughly speaking, this means (1) it is always possible that
from some point on, no messages will be received, and (2) if a processor (or
general) i does not get any information to the contrary (by receiving some
message), then i considers it possible that none of its messages were received.
In particular, in the coordinated attack problem as stated, communication is
not guaranteed. Halpern and Moses then prove that in such a system, noth-
ing can become common knowledge unless it is also common knowledge in
the absence of communication. This implies the impossibility of coordinated
attack:
Theorem 2 [HM90] Any correct protocol for the coordinated attack problem
guarantees that neither general ever attacks.
Common knowledge of ϕ is defined to be the infinite conjunction of the for-
mulas Ekϕ. This definition seems to suggest that common knowledge has an
“inherently infinite” nature. Indeed, for a fact that is not common knowledge
to become common knowledge, each participating agent must come to know an
infinite collection of new facts. Could this be one of the reasons that common
knowledge is impossible to attain in this case? As we shall see, it is not.
In practice, there is always a finite bound on the number of possible local
states of an agent in a real-world system. A finite-state system is one where
each agent’s set of possible local states is finite. Fischer and Immerman [FI86]
showed that in a finite-state system, common knowledge is equivalent to Ek
for a sufficiently large k. Nevertheless, the result that common knowledge
is not attainable if communication is not guaranteed applies equally well to
finite-state systems (as do our later results on the unattainability of common
knowledge). Thus, in such cases, Ekϕ is unattainable for some sufficiently
large k. (Intuitively, k is large enough so that the agents cannot count up to k;
that is, k is tantamount to infinity for these agents.) So the unattainability of
common knowledge in this case is not due to the fact that common knowledge
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is defined in terms of an infinite conjunction.
3 Common Knowledge and Uncertainty
As we have seen, common knowledge cannot be attained when communication
is not guaranteed. Halpern and Moses show further that common knowledge
cannot be attained in a system in which communication is guaranteed, but
where there is no bound on the time it takes for messages to be delivered. It
would seem that when all messages are guaranteed to be delivered within a
fixed amount of time, say one second, attaining common knowledge should be
a simple matter. But things are not always as simple as they seem; even in
this case, uncertainty causes major difficulties.
Consider the following example: Assume that two agents, Alice and Bob, com-
municate over a channel in which (it is common knowledge that) message de-
livery is guaranteed. Moreover, suppose that there is only slight uncertainty
concerning message delivery times. It is commonly known that any message
sent from Alice to Bob reaches Bob within ε time units. Now suppose that
at some point Alice sends Bob a message µ that does not specify the sending
time in any way. Bob does not know initially that Alice sent him a message.
We assume that when Bob receives Alice’s message, he knows that it is from
her. How do Alice and Bob’s state of knowledge change with time?
Let sent(µ) be the statement that Alice sent the message µ. After ε time
units, we have KAKBsent(µ), that is, Alice knows that Bob knows that
she sent the message µ. And clearly, this state of knowledge does not oc-
cur before ε time units. Define (KAKB)
ksent(µ) by letting it be sent(µ) for
k = 0, and KAKB(KAKB)
k−1sent(µ) for k ≥ 1. It is not hard to verify that
(KAKB)
ksent(µ) holds after kε time units, and does not hold before then.
In particular, common knowledge of sent(µ) is never attained. This may not
seem too striking when we think of ε that is relatively large, say a day, or
an hour. The argument, however, is independent of the magnitude of ε, and
remains true even for small values of ε. Even if Alice and Bob are guaranteed
that Alice’s message arrives within one nanosecond, they still never attain
common knowledge that her message was sent!
Now let us consider what happens if both Alice and Bob use the same clock,
and suppose that, instead of sending µ, Alice sends at time m a message µ′
that specifies the sending time, such as
“This message is being sent at time m; µ.”
Recall that it is common knowledge that every message sent by Alice is re-
ceived by Bob within ε time units. When Bob receives µ′, he knows that µ′
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was sent at time m. Moreover, Bob’s receipt of µ′ is guaranteed to happen no
later than time m+ ε. Since Alice and Bob use the same clock, it is common
knowledge at time m + ε that it is m + ε. It is also common knowledge that
any message sent at time m is received by time m+ ε. Thus, at time m + ε,
the fact that Alice sent µ′ to Bob is common knowledge.
Note that in the first example common knowledge will never hold regardless of
whether ε is a day, an hour, or a nanosecond. The slight uncertainty about the
sending time and the message transmission time prevents common knowledge
of µ from ever being attained in this scenario. What makes the second example
so dramatically different? When a fact ϕ is common knowledge, everybody
must know that it is. It is impossible for agent i to know that ϕ is common
knowledge without agent j knowing it as well. This means that the transition
from ϕ not being common knowledge to its being common knowledge must
involve a simultaneous change in all relevant agents’ knowledge. In the first
example, the uncertainty makes such a simultaneous transition impossible,
while in the second, having the same clock makes a simultaneous transition
possible and this transition occurs at time m + ε. These two examples help
illustrate the connection between simultaneity and common knowledge and
the effect this can have on the attainability of common knowledge. We now
formalize and further explore this connection.
4 Simultaneous Events
The Alice and Bob examples illustrate how the transition from a situation in
which a fact is not common knowledge to one where it is common knowledge
requires simultaneous events to take place at all sites of the system. The re-
lationship between simultaneity and common knowledge, is in fact even more
fundamental than that. We saw by example earlier that actions that must be
performed simultaneously by all parties, such as attacking in the coordinated
attack problem, become common knowledge as soon as they are performed:
common knowledge is a prerequisite for simultaneous actions. In this sec-
tion, we give a result that says that a fact’s becoming common knowledge
requires the occurrence of simultaneous events at different sites of the system.
Moreover, the results say that in a certain technical sense, the occurrence of
simultaneous events is necessarily common knowledge. This demonstrates the
strong link between common knowledge and simultaneous events.
To make this claim precise, we need to formalize the notion of simultaneous
events. We begin by briefly reviewing the framework of [FHMV95] for modeling
multi-agent systems. 5 We assume that at each point in time, each agent is in
5The general framework presented here for ascribing knowledge in multi-agent
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some local state. Informally, this local state encodes the information available
to the agent at this point. In addition, there is an environment state, that
keeps track of everything relevant to the system not recorded in the agents’
states.
A global state is an (n+1)-tuple (se, s1, . . . , sn) consisting of the environment
state se and the local state si of each agent i. A run of the system is a function
from time (which, for ease of exposition, we assume ranges over the natural
numbers) to global states. Thus, if r is a run, then r(0), r(1), . . . is a sequence
of global states that, roughly speaking, is a complete description of how the
system evolves over time in one possible execution of the system. We take
a system to consist of a set of runs. Intuitively, these runs describe all the
possible sequences of events that could occur in a system.
Given a system R, we refer to a pair (r,m) consisting of a run r ∈ R and
a time m as a point. If r(m) = (se, s1, . . . , sn), we define ri(m) = si, for
i = 1, . . . , n; thus, ri(m) is process i’s local state at the point (r,m). We
say two points (r,m) and (r′, m′) are indistinguishable to agent i, and write
(r,m) ∼i (r
′, m′), if ri(m) = r
′
i(m
′), i.e., if agent i has the same local state
at both points. Finally, we define an interpreted system to be a pair (R, pi)
consisting of a system R together with a mapping pi that associates a truth
assignment to the primitive propositions with each global state.
An interpreted system can be viewed as a Kripke structure: the points are
the possible worlds, and ∼i plays the role of the accessibility relation. We
give semantics to knowledge formulas in interpreted systems just as in Kripke
structures: Given a point (r,m) in an interpreted system I = (R, pi), we
have (I, r,m) |= Kiϕ if (I, r
′, m′) |= ϕ for all points (r′, m′) such that
(r′, m′) ∼i (r,m). Notice that under this interpretation, an agent knows ϕ
if ϕ is true at all the situations the system could be in, given the agent’s cur-
rent information (as encoded by his local state). Since ∼i is an equivalence
relation, knowledge in this framework satisfies the axioms of the modal system
S5. If G is a set of agents, we define EG (“everyone in the group G knows”) by
saying (I, r,m) |= EGϕ if (I, r,m) |= Kiϕ for every i ∈ G. We define CG (“it
is common knowledge among the agents in G”) by saying (I, r,m) |= CGϕ if
(I, r,m) |= (EG)
kϕ for every k. When G is the set of all agents, we may write
E for EG, and C for CG. We write I |= ϕ if (I, r,m) |= ϕ for every point
(r,m) of the system I.
We now give a few more definitions, all relative to a fixed interpreted sys-
tem I = (R, pi). Let S denote the set of points of the system R. Define an
event in R to be a subset of S; intuitively, these are the points where the
systems originated with Halpern and Moses [HM90,Mos86] and Rosenschein [Ros85].
Variants were also introduced by Fischer and Immerman [FI86], Halpern and Fagin
[HF89], Parikh and Ramanujam [PR85], and Rosenschein and Kaelbling [RK86].
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event e holds. An event e is said to hold at a point (r,m) if (r,m) ∈ e. Of
special interest are events whose occurrence is reflected in an agent’s local
state. More formally, an event e is local to i (in interpreted system I) if there
is a set Lei of i’s local states such that for all points (r,m) we have (r,m) ∈ e
iff ri(m) ∈ L
e
i . The events of sending a message, receiving a message, and per-
forming an internal action are examples of local events for agent i. We remark
that the definition of a local event does not imply that an event that is local
to i cannot also be local to j. In order to be local to both agents, it only needs
to be reflected in the local states of both agents.
Certain events depend only on the global state. An event e is a state event
if there is a set Ge of global states such that for all points (r,m) we have
(r,m) ∈ e iff r(m) ∈ Ge. It is easy to see that local events are state events.
More generally, a state event is one that depends only on what is recorded in
the local states of the agents and the state of the environment. We associate
with every state event e a primitive proposition ψe that is true at the global
state r(m) if and only if (r,m) ∈ e. This is well-defined, because it follows
easily from the definition of state events that if e is a state event and (r,m)
and (r′, m′) are points such that r(m) = r′(m′), then (r,m) ∈ e if and only if
(r′, m′) ∈ e.
We can similarly associate with every formula ϕ an event evI(ϕ) = {(r,m) :
(I, r,m) |= ϕ}. The event evI(ϕ) thus holds exactly when ϕ holds. We
call evI(ϕ) the event of ϕ holding (in I). It is easy to check that an event e
is local to i if and only if Kiψe holds, that is, if and only if i knows that e is
holding. Moreover, the event of Kiϕ holding is always a local event for i.
We are now ready to address the issue of simultaneous events. Intuitively,
two events are simultaneous if they occur at the same points. Our interest
in simultaneity is primarily in the context of coordination. Namely, we are
interested in events that are local to different agents and are coordinated
in time. Thus, we concentrate on events whose occurrence is simultaneously
reflected in the local state of the agents. More formally, we define an event
ensemble for G (or just ensemble for short) to be a mapping e assigning to
every agent i ∈ G an event e(i) local to i. An ensemble e for G is said to
be perfectly coordinated if the local events in e hold simultaneously; formally,
if (r,m) ∈ e(i) for some i ∈ G, then (r,m) ∈ e(j) for all j ∈ G. Thus, the
ensemble e for G is perfectly coordinated precisely if e(i) = e(j) for all i, j ∈ G.
Since an event e that is local to agent i is defined in terms of a set Lei of states
local to agent i, the ensemble e for G is perfectly coordinated if all the agents
in G enter their respective sets L
e(i)
i simultaneously. Thus, the events in a
perfectly coordinated ensemble are simultaneous.
An example of a perfectly coordinated ensemble is the set of local events that
correspond to the ticking of a global clock, if the ticking is guaranteed to be
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reflected simultaneously at all sites of a system. Another example is the event
of shaking hands: being a mutual action, the handshakes of the parties are
perfectly coordinated.
Given an ensemble e for G, the proposition ψe(i) corresponds to the state event
e(i) holding. We also define ψe =
∨
i∈G ψe(i). Thus, ψe is true whenever one of
the state events e(i) holds.
Proposition 3 Let I be an interpreted system and G a set of agents.
(a) For every formula ϕ, the ensemble e for G defined by e(i) = evI(KiCGϕ)
is perfectly coordinated.
(b) If e is a perfectly coordinated ensemble for G, then I |= ψe ⇒ CGψe.
(In fact, KiCGϕ in part (a) of Proposition 3 is logically equivalent to CGϕ,
but we write KiCGϕ to bring out the similarities between this result and
Proposition 6 below.) Proposition 3 precisely captures the close correspon-
dence between common knowledge and simultaneous events. It asserts that
the local events that correspond to common knowledge are perfectly coordi-
nated, and the local events in a perfectly coordinated ensemble are common
knowledge when they hold. Notice that part (a) implies in particular that the
transitions from ¬KiCGϕ to KiCGϕ, for i ∈ G, must be simultaneous. Among
other things, this helps clarify the difference between the two examples consid-
ered in Section 3: In the first example, Alice and Bob cannot attain common
knowledge of sent(µ) because they are unable to make such a simultaneous
transition, while in the second example they can (and do).
The close relationship between common knowledge and simultaneous actions is
what makes common knowledge such a useful tool for analyzing tasks involving
coordination and agreement. It also gives us some insight into how common
knowledge arises. For example, the fact that a public announcement has been
made is common knowledge, since the announcement is heard simultaneously
by everyone. (Strictly speaking, of course, this is not quite true; we return to
this issue in Section 6.) More generally, simultaneity is inherent in the notion
of copresence. As a consequence, when people sit around a table, the existence
of the table, as well as the nature of the objects on the table, are common
knowledge.
Proposition 3 formally captures the role of simultaneous actions in making
agreements and conventions common knowledge. As we discussed earlier, com-
mon knowledge is inherent in agreements and conventions. Hand shaking, face-
to-face or telephone conversation, and a simultaneous signing of a contract are
standard ways of reaching agreements. They all involve simultaneous actions
and have the effect of making the agreement common knowledge.
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5 Temporal Imprecision
As we illustrated previously and formalized in Proposition 3, simultaneity is
inherent in the notion of common knowledge (and vice versa). It follows that si-
multaneity is a prerequisite for attaining common knowledge. Alice and Bob’s
failure to reach common knowledge in the first example above can therefore
be blamed on their inability to perform a simultaneous state transition. As
might be expected, the fact that simultaneity is a prerequisite for attaining
common knowledge has additional consequences. For example, in many dis-
tributed systems each process possesses a clock. In practice, in any distributed
system there is always some uncertainty regarding the relative synchrony of
the clocks and regarding the precise message transmission times. This re-
sults in what is called the temporal imprecision of the system. The amount
of temporal imprecision in different systems varies, but it can be argued that
every practical system will have some (possibly very small) degree of impre-
cision. Formally, a given system R is said to have temporal imprecision if for
all runs r ∈ R, times m, and sets G of processes with |G| ≥ 2, there ex-
ist processes i, j ∈ G with i 6= j, a run r′ ∈ R, and a time m′ such that
r′i(m
′) = ri(m) while r
′
j(m
′) = rj(m + 1). Intuitively, in a system with tem-
poral imprecision, i is uncertain about j’s clock reading; at the point (r,m),
process i cannot tell whether j’s clock is characterized by j’s local state at
(r,m) or j’s local state at (r,m+1). Techniques from the distributed-systems
literature [DHS86,HMM85] can be used to show that any system in which,
roughly speaking, there is some initial uncertainty regarding relative clock
readings and uncertainty regarding exact message transmission times must
have temporal imprecision.
Systems with temporal imprecision turn out to have the property that no
protocol can be guaranteed to synchronize the processes’ clocks perfectly. As
we now show, events cannot be perfectly coordinated in systems with temporal
imprecision either. These two facts are closely related.
We define an ensemble e for G in I to be nontrivial if there exist a run r in I
and times m,m′ such that (r,m) ∈ ∪i∈G e(i) while (r,m
′) /∈ ∪i∈G e(i). Thus, if
e is a perfectly coordinated ensemble for G, it is trivial if for each run r of the
system and for each agent i ∈ G, the events in e(i) hold either at all points
of r or at no point of r. The definition of systems with temporal imprecision
implies the following:
Proposition 4 In a system with temporal imprecision there are no nontrivial
perfectly coordinated ensembles for G, if |G| ≥ 2.
We thus have the following corollary.
Corollary 5 [HM90] Let I be a system with temporal imprecision, let ϕ be a
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formula, and let |G| ≥ 2. Then for all runs r and times m we have (I, r,m) |=
CGϕ iff (I, r, 0) |= CGϕ.
In simple terms, Corollary 5 states that no fact can become common knowledge
during a run of a system with temporal imprecision. If the units by which time
is measured in our model are sufficiently small, then all practical distributed
systems have temporal imprecision. For example, if we work at the nanosecond
level, then there is bound to be some uncertainty regarding exact message
transmission times. On the other hand, if we model time at the level of minutes,
this uncertainty may disappear. As a result, Corollary 5 implies that no fact
can ever become common knowledge in practical distributed systems. Carrying
this argument even further, we can view essentially all real-world scenarios
as ones in which true simultaneity cannot be guaranteed. For example, the
children in the muddy children puzzle neither hear nor comprehend the father
simultaneously. There is bound to be some uncertainty about how long it
takes each of them to process the information. Thus, according to our earlier
discussion, the children in fact do not attain common knowledge of the father’s
statement.
We now seem to have a paradox. On the one hand, we have argued that com-
mon knowledge is unattainable in practical contexts. On the other hand, given
our claim that common knowledge is a prerequisite for agreements and conven-
tions and the observation that we do reach agreements and that conventions
are maintained, it seems that common knowledge is attained in practice.
What is the catch? How can we explain this discrepancy between our practical
experience and our technical results? In the next two sections, we consider two
resolutions to this paradox. The first rests on the observation that if we model
time at a sufficiently coarse level, we can and do attain common knowledge.
The question then becomes when and whether it is appropriate to model time
in this way. The second says that, although we indeed cannot attain common
knowledge, we can attain close approximations of it, and this suffices for our
purposes.
6 The Granularity of Time
Given the complexity of the real world, any mathematical model of a situation
must abstract away many details. A useful model is typically one that abstracts
away as much of the irrelevant detail as possible, leaving all and only the
relevant aspects of a situation. When modeling a particular situation, it can
often be quite difficult to decide the level of granularity at which to model
time. The notion of time in a run rarely corresponds to real time. Rather,
our choice of the granularity of time is motivated by convenience of modeling.
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Thus, in a distributed application, it may be perfectly appropriate to take
a round to be sufficiently long for a process to send a message to all other
processes, and perhaps do some local computation as well.
As we have observed, the argument that every practical system has some de-
gree of temporal imprecision holds only relative to a sufficiently fine-grained
model of time. For Proposition 4 and Corollary 5 to apply, time must be repre-
sented in sufficiently fine detail for temporal imprecision to be reflected in the
model. If a model has a coarse notion of time, then simultaneity, and hence
common knowledge, are often attainable. For example, in synchronous systems
(those where the agents have access to a shared clock, so that, intuitively, the
time is common knowledge) there is no temporal imprecision. As an example,
consider a simplified model of the muddy children problem. The initial states
of the children and the father describe what they see; later states describe ev-
erything they have heard. All communication proceeds in rounds. In round 1,
if there is at least one muddy child, a message to this effect is sent to all chil-
dren. In the odd-numbered rounds 1, 3, 5, . . . , the father sends to all children
the message “Does any of you know whether you have mud on your own fore-
head?” The children respond “Yes” or “No” in the even-numbered rounds. In
this simplified model, the children do attain common knowledge of the father’s
statement (after the first round). If, however, we “enhance” the model to take
into consideration the minute details of the neural activity in the children’s
brains, and considered time on, say, a millisecond scale, the children would
not be modeled as hearing the father simultaneously. Moreover, the children
would not attain common knowledge of the father’s statement. We conclude
that whether a given fact becomes common knowledge at a certain point, or
in fact whether it ever becomes common knowledge, depends in a crucial way
on the model being used. While common knowledge may be attainable in a
certain model of a given real world situation, it becomes unattainable once we
consider a more detailed model of the same situation.
When are we justified in reasoning and acting as if common knowledge is at-
tainable? This reduces to the question of when we can argue that one model—
in our case a coarser or less detailed model—is “as good” as another, finer,
model. The answer, of course, is “it depends on the intended application.”
Our approach for deciding whether a less detailed model is as good as another,
finer, model, is to assume that there is some “specification” of interest, and to
consider whether the finer model satisfies the same specification as the coarser
model. For example, in the muddy children puzzle, our earlier model implic-
itly assumed that the children all hear the father’s initial statement and his
later questions simultaneously. We can think of this as a coarse model where,
indeed, the children attain common knowledge. For the fine model, suppose
instead that every time the father speaks, it takes somewhere between 8 and
10 milliseconds for each child to hear and process what the father says, but
the exact time may be different for each child, and may even be different for a
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given child every time the father speaks. Similarly, after a given child speaks,
it takes between 8 and 10 milliseconds for the other children and the father to
hear and process what he says. (While there is nothing particularly significant
in our choice of 8 and 10 milliseconds, it is important that a child does not
hear any other child’s response to the father’s question before he utters his
own response.) The father does not ask his kth question until he has received
the responses from all children to his (k − 1)st question.
The specification of interest for the muddy children puzzle is the following: A
child says “Yes” if he knows whether he is muddy and says “No” otherwise.
This specification is satisfied in particular when each child follows the protocol
that if he sees k muddy children, then he responds “No” to the father’s first k
questions and “Yes” to all the questions after that. This specification is true
in both the coarse model and the fine model. Therefore, we consider the coarse
model adequate. If part of the specification had been that the children answer
simultaneously, then the coarse model would not have been adequate. For a
more formal presentation of our approach, see [FHMV95].
The observation that whether or not common knowledge is attainable de-
pends in part on how we model time was made in a number of earlier papers
[Aum89,FI86,HM90,Kur86,Nei88,NT93]. Our approach formalizes this obser-
vation and offers a rigorous way to determine when the coarse model is ade-
quate.
7 Approximations of Common Knowledge
Section 4 shows that common knowledge captures the state of knowledge re-
sulting from simultaneous events. It also shows, however, that in the absence of
events that are guaranteed to hold simultaneously, common knowledge is not
attained. In Section 6, we tried to answer the question of when we can reason
and act as if certain events were simultaneous. But there is another point of
view we can take. There are situations where events holding at different sites
need not happen simultaneously; the level of coordination required is weaker
than absolute simultaneity. For example, we may want the events to hold at
most a certain amount of time apart. It turns out that just as common knowl-
edge is the state of knowledge corresponding to perfect coordination, there
are states of shared knowledge corresponding to other forms of coordination.
We can view these states of knowledge as approximations of true common
knowledge. It is well known that common knowledge can be defined in terms
of a fixed point, as well as an infinite conjunction. As shown in [HM90], CGϕ
is equivalent to νx[EG(ϕ ∧ x)], where νx is the greatest fixed-point operator.
6
6 Formal definitions of this operator can be found in [FHMV95,HM90].
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As we shall see, the approximations of common knowledge have similar fixed-
point definitions. Fortunately, while perfect coordination is hard to attain in
practice, weaker forms of coordination are often attainable. This is one expla-
nation as to why the unattainability of common knowledge might not spell as
great a disaster as we might have originally expected. This section considers
two of these weaker forms of coordination, and their corresponding states of
knowledge.
Let us return to the first Alice and Bob example. Notice that if ε = 0, then
Alice and Bob attain common knowledge of sent(µ) immediately after the
message is sent. In this case, it is guaranteed that once the message is sent,
both agents immediately know the contents of the message, as well as the
fact that it has been sent. Intuitively, it seems that the closer ε is to 0, the
closer Alice and Bob’s state of knowledge should be to common knowledge.
Compare the situation when ε > 0 with ε = 0. As we saw, if ε > 0 then Alice
does not know that Bob received her message immediately after she sends the
message. She does, however, know that within ε time units Bob will receive
the message and know both the contents of the message and that the message
has been sent. The sending of the message results in a situation where, within
ε time units, everyone knows that the situation holds. This is analogous to the
fact that common knowledge corresponds to a situation where everyone knows
that the situation holds. This suggests that the state of knowledge resulting in
the Alice and Bob scenario should involve a fixed point of some sort. We now
formalize a notion of coordination related to the Alice and Bob example, and
define an approximation of common knowledge corresponding to this type of
coordination.
An ensemble e for G is said to be ε-coordinated (in a given system I) if
the local events in e never hold more than ε time units apart; formally, if
(r,m) ∈ e(i) for some i ∈ G, then there exists an interval I = [m′, m′+ε] such
that m ∈ I and for all j ∈ G there exists mj ∈ I for which (r,mj) ∈ e(j). Note
that ε-coordination with ε = 0 is perfect coordination. While it is essentially
infeasible in practice to coordinate events so that they hold simultaneously
at different sites of a distributed system, ε-coordination is often attainable in
practice, even in systems where there is uncertainty in message delivery time.
Moreover, when ε is sufficiently small, there are many applications for which
ε-coordination is practically as good as perfect coordination. For example,
instead of requiring a simultaneous attack in the coordinated attack problem,
it may be sufficient to require only that the two divisions attack within a
certain ε-time bound of each other. This is called an ε-coordinated attack.
More generally, ε-coordination may be practically as good as perfect coor-
dination for many instances of agreements and conventions. One example of
ε-coordination results from a message being broadcast to all members of a
group G, with the guarantee that it will reach all of the members within ε
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time units of one another. In this case it is easy to see that when an agent
receives the message, she knows the message has been broadcast, and knows
that within ε time units each of the members of G will have received the
message and will know that within ε . . .
Let ε be arbitrary. We say that within an ε interval everyone in G knows ϕ,
denoted EεGϕ, if there is an interval of ε time units containing the current
time such that each process comes to know ϕ at some point in this interval.
Formally, (I, r,m) |= EεGϕ if there exists an interval I = [m
′, m′+ ε] such that
m ∈ I and for all i ∈ G there exists mi ∈ I for which (I, r,mi) |= Kiϕ. Thus,
in the case of Alice and Bob, we have I |= sent(µ)⇒ Eε{A,B}sent(µ). We define
ε-common knowledge, denoted by CεG, using a greatest fixed-point operator:
CεGϕ =def νx[E
ε
G(ϕ∧x)]. Notice how similar this definition is to the fixed-point
definition of common knowledge. The only change is in replacing EG by E
ε
G.
Just as common knowledge is closely related to perfect coordination, ε-common
knowledge is closely related to ε-coordination. We now make this claim precise.
The next proposition is analogous to Proposition 3.
Proposition 6 Let I be an interpreted system and G a set of agents.
(a) For every formula ϕ, the ensemble e for G defined by e(i) = evI(KiC
ε
Gϕ)
is ε-coordinated.
(b) If e is an ε-coordinated ensemble for G, then I |= ψe ⇒ CεGψe.
Note that in part (a), we write KiC
ε
Gϕ; we cannot write C
ε
Gϕ, since evI(C
ε
Gϕ)
is not an event local to agent i.
Since in the coordinated attack problem message delivery is not guaranteed, it
can be shown that the generals cannot achieve even ε-coordinated attack. On
the other hand, if messages are guaranteed to be delivered within ε units of
time, then ε-coordinated attack can be accomplished. General A simply sends
General B a message saying “attack” and attacks immediately; General B
attacks upon receipt of the message.
Although ε-common knowledge is useful for the analysis of systems where
the uncertainty in message communication time is small, it is not quite as
useful in the analysis of systems where message delivery may be delayed for
a long period of time. In such systems, rather than perfect or ε-coordination,
what can often be achieved is eventual coordination. An ensemble e for G is
eventually coordinated (in a given system I) if, for every run of the system, if
some event in e holds during the run, then all events in e do. More formally, if
(r,m) ∈ e(i) for some i ∈ G, then for all j ∈ G there exists some mj for which
(r,mj) ∈ e(j). An example of an eventual coordination of G consists of the
delivery of (copies of) a message broadcast to every member of G in a system
with message delays. An agent receiving this message knows the contents of
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the message, as well as the fact that each other member of G must receive the
message at some point in time, either past, present, or future.
Eventual coordination gives rise to eventual common knowledge, denoted by
C⋄G, and defined by C
⋄
Gϕ =def νx[E
⋄
G(ϕ ∧ x)]. Here we define E
⋄
Gϕ to hold at
(I, r,m) if for each i ∈ G there is some time mi such that (I, r,mi) |= Kiϕ.
Thus, E⋄G can be viewed as the limit of E
ε
G as ε approaches infinity. It is
straightforward to show that C⋄G is related to eventual coordination just as CG
is related to perfect coordination, and CεG to ε-coordination. Interestingly,
although CεG is definable as an infinite conjunction, it can be shown that C
⋄
G
is not [FHMV95]. We really need to use fixed points here; cf. [Bar88].
Just as ε-coordinated attack is a weakening of the simultaneity requirement
of coordinated attack, a further weakening of the simultaneity requirement is
given by eventually coordinated attack. This requirement says that if one of the
two divisions attacks, then the other division eventually attacks. If messages
are guaranteed to be delivered eventually, then even if there is no bound on
message delivery time, an eventually coordinated attack can be carried out.
The notions of ε-common knowledge and of eventual common knowledge are
from [HM90]. Our contribution here is in introducing ensembles as a for-
malization of the concept of coordination and in showing that approxima-
tions of common knowledge correspond to approximations of coordination.
We note also that other approximations to common knowledge have been
considered, including timestamped common knowledge [HM90], probabilistic
common knowledge [BD87,FH94,HT93,KPN90,MS89], and concurrent com-
mon knowledge [PT92]. All these can be defined via small variations on the
fixed-point definition of common knowledge. All of these variants are weaker
than common knowledge. The state of continual common knowledge defined
and used in [HMW90] is a variant of common knowledge that is generally
strictly stronger than common knowledge.
8 Summary
The central theme of this paper is an attempt to resolve the paradox of com-
mon knowledge raised in [HM90]: Although common knowledge can be shown
to be a prerequisite for day-to-day activities of coordination and agreement, it
can also be shown to be unattainable in practice. The resolution of this para-
dox leads to a deeper understanding of the nature of common knowledge and
simultaneity, and shows once again the importance of the modeling process. In
particular, it brings out the importance of the granularity at which we model
time, and stresses the need to consider the applications for which these notions
are being used. Moreover, by using the notion of event ensembles, we are able
16
to clarify the tight relationship between common knowledge and coordination.
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